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How surprising is the insight, that being equals I in the 15th lecture of the Doctrine of Science 
1804/II? It might have been indeed an unexpected turn for his contemporaries in Berlin listening 
to Fichte for the first time, but should it be surprising for us, having at least since 2012 (the year 
the last volume of [Gesamtausgabe] appeared) access to all his published and unpublished 
works?  
 I want to propose a way of reading Fichte, which bypasses two popular and contradictory 
interpretations of his philosophy in the post-Jena period: (a) the Absolute is the new first 
principle (hence the I is just a shadow of the much higher being) and (b) his system basically 
remains unchanged (hence the being is nothing more than the I). At first, I analyze the functions 
of later Fichte’s improved version of the Kantian and Reinholdian abstract subject-object-
symbolism and assign specific content to it. This will shed light on the structure and the first 
principle of the Doctrine of Science 1804/II. In the second section I give reasons why Fichte 
calls both God and I “absolute” and “pure being” and explain their relation to each other 
referring to a thought experiment sometimes used by Kant—an analogy between the divine and 
human (pure) reason. The analogical thinking of this kind remains within the borders of 
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Several interpreters stress discontinuity in Fichte’s development and believe that he abandons 
the critical path in his later works. Henrich and Gloy assume that the later Fichte transforms his 
“deficient” (circular) theory of self-consciousness by putting God as the primal unity and 
ground of self-consciousness on the top of his system.2 God, the absolute being, is, as Rivera 
de Rosales writes, “the real condition or ratio essendi”3 of knowledge in the Doctrine of 
Science. These and similar views bring Fichte’s later project close to mysticism and (Neo-
)Platonism: the absolute I and the world become merely a shadow of the highest principle. 
Numerous researchers try, however, “demystifying” his later works claiming, like Ivaldo, 
that—although some passages may purport it—Fiche’s later philosophy does not represent any 
“objectivistic metaphysics” or an “onto-theo-logic.”4 Ivaldo, Schmidt, Stolzenberg, Asmuth, 
Schlösser, Ivanenko, Traub and Loock, to name a few, either equate the absolute being with the 
first principle of the Jena Fichte, or recognize strong structural similarities to the absolute I and 
exclusively or prevalently transcendental forms of argumentation in Fichte’s philosophy after 
1800.5 The most promising demystification strategy is brought up by Schmidt, Stolzenberg, 
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5 See Andreas Schmidt, Der Grund des Wissens. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre in den Versionen von 1794/95, 1804/II 
und 1812 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004); (2006): Jürgen Stolzenberg, „Fichtes Deduktionen des Ich 
1804 und 1794,“ Fichte-Studien 30 (2006), 1-13. Christoph Asmuth, „Transzendentalphilosophie oder absolute 
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and—to some extent—by Hoeltzel,6 who draw on Kant’s concept of pure practical reason or 
reason in general to understand the highest principle in the Jena and Berlin Fichte. I suggest to 
rather choose Kant’s theory of ideas, it is the theory of pure reason in the narrow sense as the 
starting point. The last decades of Kant research, especially—but not only—related to the 
Transcendental Dialectic,7 re-discovered the “other side”, the non-destructive transcendental 
account of ideas and metaphysics. This helped making a detection and a re-evaluation of the 
whole system of different kinds of ideas in Kant (postulates, transcendental, simple theoretical, 
practical (moral, religious and political), aesthetical, architectonic ideas, and those ideas that 
represent the pure reason itself) possible. According to Fichte’s programmatic demand of a 
complete deduction of all main acts of consciousness, the system of ideas, starting with the idea 
of pure, self-positing reason (the first and highest act in the Doctrine of Science), must be 
derived just as the system of categories and other results of the Kantian philosophy. This is the 
key to understand different principles and their order in Fichte’s works. I will not explain this 
view and Fichte’s deduction of ideas in detail in this paper, but this is the background I will 
draw on.8 
 Following the “demystification agenda”, I want to argue against the assumption that 
transcendental philosophy as a research program, which was introduced by Kant, is abandoned 
in the Doctrine of Science 1804/II or in general by the later Fichte. The concept of God—the 
absolute of the religious standpoint—is insofar (besides the practical implications) theoretically 
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De Gruyter, 2016), Marcus Willaschek, Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), Rudolf Meer, Der transzendentale Grundsatz der Vernunft. 
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8 See Michael Lewin, Das System der Ideen. Zur perspektivistisch-metaphilosophischen Begründung der Vernunft 
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interesting and relevant for the scientific endeavor of Doctrine of Science, as it is an important 
example for an idea that can be used to indicate existence of our pure reason (in the narrow 
sense) and to examine its functionality. Fichte invites his audience in Berlin to create a pure 
concept of God—and it is more familiar with it than with the broadly misunderstood idea of the 
absolute I—to investigate theoretical and practical dimensions, possibilities, and borders of our 
pure thinking. In the research program of transcendental philosophy, reason (in the narrow 
sense) is a faculty that operates with ideas as with purest form of representation we are capable 
of. The common title for all ideas is, as Kant states in the Transcendental Dialectic, the 
unconditioned, or the absolute (KrV A324/B380). To think the absolute means to use reason—
a person who creates the idea of God proves herself to be capable of pure thinking, it is of 
freedom or of the highest form of spontaneity. As God can be seen as absolute, of itself, in 
itself, and through itself, the reason, or the I, which “lives” in the activity of pure thinking or 
pure (self-)positing can be regarded as absolute itself, it is as the absolute I. This is—in a very 
few words—the basic “insight” in the 15th lecture of the Doctrine of Science 1804/II, which 
contains the “doctrine of reason and truth” (18042, 115; GA, II/8: 228-29, “reason” marked by 
M.L.). 
 What we find in the period between 1804 and 1806 in Fichte’s works is not a mixture of 
purported transcendent cognitions and transcendental philosophy. Neither the reason or self-
consciousness nor the world are derived from God. But on the other side one also cannot simply 
equate the absolute with the absolute I. This would be unjustified considering the evolvement 
of Fichte’s thinking after 1800. In the following, I want to show how I have come to my 
interpretation of the “insight” Fichte speaks of in the 15th lecture, which must not necessarily 
be “surprising” for those familiar with the earlier versions of the Doctrine of Science. In the 
first section of my paper (I), I want to argue that the thinking of different subject-object-
relations, and the corresponding idealism-realism-dialectic, constitutes the structure of the 
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Doctrine of Science 1804/II. This structure leaves no doubt that the absolute of the Doctrine of 
Science is the self-positing pure reason, and that God cannot be the highest principle in Fichte’s 
system. In the second section (II) I want to detect the duplicity of the absolute as God on the 
one hand and as reason (or I / We) on the other hand in this text, and explain it in the sense of 
an analogy, which was—among other things—introduced for didactical purposes and 




(a) Subject-Object-Relations (S-O-R) 
 
The abstract terminology of subjects, objects, and their relation to each other is a basic tool used 
in the transcendental philosophy. Kant differentiates between subjective and objective 
deduction of categories and ideas, speaks of relation of representations to an absolute subject 
(soul) or to an absolute object (world) (see KrV A333-34/ B390-91), describes the self-
consciousness in terms of a subject-object-relation and so on. Karl Leonhard Reinhold 
recognized that subject-object-relations underlie every epistemic act of consciousness, and that 
they are all mediated by different types of representation.9 Thus, he suggested the concept 
“representation” to be the central concept in transcendental philosophy and did it for a very 
good reason. Kant, namely, declared at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic 
“representation” as genus, under which stand all different types of representation analyzed in 
 
9 Reinhold’s philosophy, a long time almost completely out of focus in the research on classical German 
philosophy, was rediscovered in the last decades. See especially Krankheit des Zeitalters oder heilsame 
Provokation? Skeptizismus in der nachkantischen Philosophie, eds. Martin Bondeli, Klaus Vieweg and Jiri Chotas 
(Paderborn: Fink, 2016); Karl Leonhard Reinhold and the Enlightenment, ed. George Giovanni (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2010); Am Rande des Idealismus. Studien zur Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds, eds. Wolfgang 
Kersting and Dirk Westerkamp (Paderborn: mentis, 2009), and K. L. Reinhold. Am Vorhof des Idealismus, ed. 
Pierluigi Valenza (Pisa-Roma: Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 2006). 
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the Critique of Pure Reason: sensation, intuition, empirical and pure concepts as well as ideas 
(see KrV A320/B376). Subject, object, and their relation to each other via representation are 
therefore basic elements of all epistemic acts—Reinhold formulated this insight, as we know, 
as principle of consciousness [Satz des Bewusstseins], a fact, that everyone should be able to 
prove for herself as universally valid through personal introspection. 
 Fichte could not agree that the principle of consciousness is a solid ground for a system based 
on results of the Kantian philosophy. As he states in a letter to Reinhold: Had he waited until 
all three Critiques appeared before starting to work on his system, he could have found the right 
first principle, it is the absolute I (see the letter to Reinhold from July 2, 1795, GA, III/2: 346). 
So, there are two basic modifications Fichte makes to Reinhold’s model of subject-object-
thinking, which significantly change it. Firstly, subjects and objects are not only mediated by 
representation, but also by all other acts of consciousness [Bewusstseinshandlungen] including 
pure acts of positing as well as feelings and acts of will like needs and conation [Begehren and 
Streben]. Secondly, there is—in one single case: in the case of the absolute I—a unity of subject 
and object possible. This unity is established by means of a pure act of self-positing, a fact-act 
[Tathandlung] involving the intellectual intuition, which is not dependent on the subject-object-
difference and therefore does not fall under the standard definition of a representation. So, what 
happens here and where I want to point at is that Fichte creates a new transcendental apparatus 
and a new logic in working with abstract language of subjects, objects, and their interrelation, 
which goes beyond Kant’s and Reinhold’s usage of the same and which becomes fully 
differentiated especially in the year 1804. Subjects and objects play the role of abstract 
transcendental symbols used for difficult logical operations. One can also say they are pictures 
as well as, for instance, light, life, and other creative imaginations we encounter in the Doctrine 
of Science 1804/II. As Fichte stated in his essay On the Linguistic Capacity and the Origins of 
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Language (1795)10 (see GA, I/3: 103 (remark)), he does not believe in the indispensability of 
written and spoken language for abstract thinking—one can also productively think in pictures 
created by our faculty of imagination. The advantage of thinking in abstract pictures like 
subject, object, the “through”, pure being, absolute, the point of oneness, light, life etc. lies in 
the possibility to eschew certain (empirical and non-empirical) content which could distract the 
philosopher from targeted logical operations. The problem is, however, that when it comes to a 
right interpretation of these imaginations, one can understand very different and even contrary 
concepts behind them, especially when some of the imaginations are used—depending on 
context—in many varying ways. In my opinion, the transcendental symbolism of subjects, 
objects, and their interrelations, has five main functions in Fichte’s philosophy. The abstract 
language of subjects and objects is used: 
(1) to indicate relations. Something can rely rather to a subject or to an object, or something 
can be self-relating; 
(2) to articulate certain qualities and mental attitudes. “Subject” stands rather for activity, 
idealism and thinking, whereas “object” for passivity, realism and being; 
(3) to express standpoints. To do so, Fichte uses imaginations of “enduring” (one can also 
say “standing” or “motionless” (S), (O)) as well as “moving” (“self-forming”, “living” (S’), 
(O’)) subjects and objects in the 28th lecture 1804/II; 
(4) to illustrate objects of knowledge. “Subject-object” (S=O) stands, for example, for the 
absolute I or reason and “object”, in the quality “enduring object” (O), for the world; 
(5) to express areas of science. Natural sciences, for example, primarily deal with nature, it 
is with “enduring object” (O). Jurisprudence deals with “enduring subject” (S).  
 
 
10 For the English translation see Jerry Surber, “On the Linguistic Capacity and the Origin of Language,” in Jerry 




(b) The Unity of Subject and Object (S=O) 
 
If I try to determine the unity of subject and object using these five points, I come to the 
following results:  
 
(1) A subject-object must be understood in terms of a self-relation, just like it was at the 
beginning of the first Doctrine of Science in Jena: I equals I, or, to put it in another way, I 
(respectively reason) is for itself, it posits its own being, and therein lies its essence (see 
GWL, GA I/2: 259 and WLnm[K], GA IV/3: 328 and 341). Any other possible relation to a 
subject or object is omitted in the act of self-positing: the I, with the predicate “absolute”, is 
self-enclosed in a sphere in which it is only being for itself and not for the other. 
(2) As for the qualitative determination of a subject-object, it must be seen as ideal-real 
(respectively real-ideal) or, which is the same, as unity of thinking and being. The Jena 
Fichte stated clearly that the Doctrine of Science is neither a mere idealism nor realism, but 
a combination of both. Its first principle expresses the unity of real and ideal elements: fact-
act means that I act (real activity) and that I have immediate consciousness of that act (ideal 
activity) (see WLnm[K], GA IV/3: 361). In other words, the self-positing is an expression 
of being of the absolute I, whereby “being” is to be understood in a higher sense, as pure real 
activity, which is inseparably accompanied by thinking, it is by intellectual intuition of the 
same. 
(3) “Subject-object” is a transcendental symbol that represents the standpoint of the Doctrine 
of Science. While every standpoint or world view has its own absolute, the absolute of the 
Doctrine of Science is not an object or subject. Enduring or living and self-forming subjects 
and objects are—as Fichte demonstrates in the last lectures in 1804—just straitened sides or 
appearances of the subject-object-unity. 
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(4) This unity stands for what Fichte synonymously calls “absolute I”, “reason” and “pure 
knowledge”, which is the genuine object of knowledge of the Doctrine of Science. 
(5) The corresponding area of knowledge is Doctrine of Science respectively critical 
metaphysics. 
 
(c) The Structure of the Doctrine of Science 1804/II 
 
The core thesis in the first section of my paper is that subject-object-symbols are used by Fichte 
to structuralize the Doctrine of Science. If we find out that he assigned concrete and indisputable 
content to certain abstract operations with subjects and objects which constitute the structure of 
Doctrine of Science, it will shed light on what the first principle is or is not. There are at least 
four basic questions which are discussed in relation to the structure of Fichte’s lectures 1804/II: 
(1) At what point do the prolegomena end? (2) Where do we find the first principle?11 (3) What 
is the concrete succession of bottom-up and top-down-movements of deduction?12 And, what 
is most remarkable, (4) if Fichte’s lectures in this period consist of a synthesis of 25 
argumentation steps—a debate started by Martial Gueroult, pursued by Joachim Widman and 
recently revisited by Alexander Schnell.13 What I am interested in and what has not been yet 
(as far as I know) discussed is a parallel between what I call the idealism-realism-dialectic,14 
 
11 Do we really encounter it first in the 15th lecture—or even before? Or only and actually in the 23rd lecture (see: 
Ulrich Schlösser, Das Erfassen des Einleuchtens. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 als Kritik an der Annahme 
entzogener Voraussetzungen unseres Wissens und als Philosophie des Gewissseins (Berlin: Philo Fine Arts, 
2001)). 
12 See Jens Lemanski, Summa und System. Historie und Systematik vollendeter bottom-up- und top-down-Theorien 
(Paderborn: mentis, 2013), 189-248. 
13 See Martial Guéroult, L’Évolution et la structure de la Doctrine de la science chez Fichte (Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres, 1930); Joachim Widman, Die Grundstruktur des transzendentalen Wissens. Nach Johann Gottlieb Fichtes 
Wissenschaftslehre 1804 (2) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977); Joachim Widman, „Zum Strukturverhältnis der W. L. 1804 
(1) und 1804 (2).“ In: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Erste Wissenschaftslehre von 1804, ed. Hans Gliwitzky 
(Stuttgart/Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1969), and Alexander Schnell, Réflexion et Spéculation. L‘idéalisme 
transcendantal chez Fichte et Schelling (Grenoble: Millon, 2009), 31-42.  
14 On the idealism-realism-relation in Fichte see especially Valentin Pluder, Die Vermittlung von Idealismus und 
Realismus in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie: eine Studie zu Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt: frommann-holzboog, 2013). 
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which starts at the 11th and ends at the 15th lecture, and the deduction of 5 standpoints or areas, 
in which reason (pure knowledge) is active, in the 28th lecture.15 I will illustrate this parallel 
with the help of the following intuitions and reflections: 
 (a) The exceptional status of Doctrine of Science 1804/II is well known. It does not start with 
the first principle right away, but with a bottom-up-movement we also encounter in The 
Vocation of Man (1800) and in Fichte’s late lectures on the Facts of Consciousness (1810-
1813). This movement of ascent has the function to negate all constrained mental operations 
and points of view that are deficient and inappropriate to articulate the absolute principle. 
Perhaps one can also use the Hegelian term “sublate” [aufheben] in this context, as the 
abandoned standpoints are not discarded entirely, but rather transformed into a higher unity, 
which they are all just certain sides of. This higher unity or the absolute of the Doctrine of 
Science is an act of pure genesis, which differentiates itself inwardly into the same moments 
that were rejected and criticized as merely factual. In my reading of Fichte’s lectures 1804/II, 
these moments are two different kinds of realism and idealism, which re-appear as four 
standpoints below the self-positing of reason. 
 (b) This statement can be supported by the thought that it is a not a mere coincidence that 
the reader of Fichte’s Doctrine of Science 1804/II encounters exactly two realisms, a lower and 
a higher one, and two objects, an enduring (O) and living (O’), as well as two idealisms, a lower 
and a higher, and two subjects, an enduring (S) and living (S’). 
 (c) Furthermore, “realism” and “idealism” are, as Fichte states in the 14th lecture, just other 
words for objectivism and subjectivism.16 So, if one considers the different functions of subject-
 
15 Fichte calls these five standpoints also spheres [Wirkungssphären], in which we operate with ideas (the spheres 
of pure reason’s activity, if we keep in mind that this is the faculty that deals foremost with ideas in Kant and 
Fichte), in On the Nature of the Scholar and its Manifestations (see GA, I/8: 79). See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Über 
Das Wesen Des Gelehrten, eds. Alfred Denker, Jeffery Kinlaw, and Holger Zaborowski (Freiburg/München: 
Alber, 2020) for recent research on this text. 
16 Fichte puts it very clearly: “realism, or more accurately objectivism” and “idealism which, because of language’s 
ambiguity, we might better call subjectivism” (18042, 109; GA, II/8: 214-15). 
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object-symbols I have distinguished above, following persistent meanings can be assigned to 
the moments of the idealism-realism-dialectic in correspondence to the five standpoints (I 
present first the realisms and then the idealisms, and assign numbers from the hierarchical order 
in the doctrine of five standpoints to them):17 
 (1) Realism, or objectivism, is a mental attitude “of the thinking subject” (18042, 92; GA, 
II/8: 172-73) which is characterized by passivity. The subject gives itself up to an object and 
loses itself in the content without reflecting upon its own actions. This attitude appertains to 
sensuality and produces the enduring object (O), nature, the object of natural sciences.  
 (4) Higher realism, or objectivism, is characterized by the self-destruction of the subject. 
The object it relates to is seen as being self-constructing and therefore not, by any means, 
produced by it. “Hence, nothing at all remains here of a pregiven us” (18042, 98; GA, II/8: 186-
87). The subject becomes engrossed in object in a higher sense, as a self-forming or living one 
(O’), it is God, the absolute of the religious standpoint and of theology.18 
 (2) Idealism, or subjectivism, is a mental attitude which relies heavily on the fact of 
reflection. This attitude leads to the standpoint of enduring subject (S) which determines the 
object and manifests itself in the standpoint of legality and morality. 
 (3) Higher idealism, or subjectivism, represents energy of thinking and creativity. Object is 
formed by the “living” subject (S’). This results in the standpoint of art and morality. 
 (5) Unity of realism and idealism, or of objectivism and subjectivism (O=S), is therefore 
reason or absolute I, the standpoint of the Doctrine of Science (see I (b)).19 
 
 
17 I will do it in no particular order, as my aim is not an interpretation of the dialectic, but simply the assignment 
of the S-O symbols to specific content from the lectures 11-14 and the summary in the second part of the 15th 
lecture. 
18 This object in a higher sense was not yet present in the Foundations of the Entire Doctrine of Science 1794/95. 
19 This deduction of the sciences approximately corresponds to the deduction in the end of the Doctrine of Science 







reason / truth 
15th lecture 
5 areas of knowledge / science / 5 spheres 
of reason’s acting / appearance 
Lecture 28 
   
(2) S (idealism) O=S 
real=ideal 
being=thinking 
(1) O (nature | sensuality | natural sciences)  
(1) O (realism) (2) S (person | right | jurisprudence) 
(4) O’ (higher realism) (3) S’ (person | art | ethics & aesthetics) 
(3) S’ (higher idealism) (4) O’ (God | religion | theology) 
(5) → (5) S=O (reason | science | DoS) 
 
If I am right and this construction constitutes the structure of Fichte’s lectures, there can be no 
doubt that the first principle of the Doctrine of Science 1804/II is not God, as it would be the 
position of higher realism, but pure reason. Reason or the I is the only subject-object we have, 




There are, nonetheless, at least two points which may confuse a reader of Fichte’s lectures 
1804/II. Firstly, Fichte sometimes speaks of a preference for realism (objectivism). This can 
lead to the belief that God is the real absolute of the Doctrine of Science. The relevant passages 
furnish, however, no proof for this assumption. In the 11th lecture Fichte gives his listeners the 
main reason for the predilection for the realistic perspective: “idealism renders impossible even 
the being of its opposite, and thus it is decidedly one-sided. On the other hand, realism at least 
leaves the being of its opposite undisputed” (18042, 92; GA, II/8: 172-73).21 In other words: 
 
20 While in the case of God, there is a gap between the thinking reason and its object. 
21 In the 17th and 21st lectures we encounter a preference for idealism. For the movement of descent, the idealistic 
aspects “of” and “through” are more relevant. Speaking of preferences, Fichte utters rather methodological remarks 
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radical idealism is more harmful to the Doctrine of Science than radical realism, which does not 
annihilate the thinking, but just does not make use of it. This statement must be seen in the 
context of Jacobi’s charge of nihilism against Fichte that pure systematic scientific knowledge 
leads to abandonment of reality.22 Fichte countered this objection already in the end of the first 
lecture: 
 
Namely, as soon as one has heard that the science of knowing presents itself as idealism, one immediately infers 
that it locates the absolute in what I have been calling thinking or consciousness which stands over against being 
as its other half and which therefore can no more be the absolute than can its opposite (18042, 26; GA, II/8: 16-
17). 
 
Pure knowledge is thus not merely an ideal, but also a real acting. Self-positing is not only 
knowing of, but a real self-positing of reason. We perform this act and “live” in it; the 
knowledge has therefore reality for us. This reality does not come from the self-forming object, 
it is God, as this is the standpoint of higher realism, which, as Fichte said in the cited passage, 
“can no more be the absolute than can its opposite”. 
 The second point, which can confuse the reader of Fichte’s lectures even more, is his 
energetical and uncompromising appreciation of the absolute of the religious standpoint and of 
theology. It can even provoke the opinion, that God is the actual absolute of the Doctrine of 
Science. The thesis of the second part of my paper is that Fichte, being in conversation with his 
contemporaries, uses productively an analogy between the thinking of God on the one and the 
thinking of human pure reason on the other hand. 
  
 
to explain and reflect on the procedure of bottom-up- (preference for realism) and top-down-deductions 
(preference for idealism). 
22 See for a broader context also Marco Ivaldo, „Leben und Philosophie: Die Anweisung zum seeligen Leben als 
Antwort auf Jacobis Nihilismus-Vorwurf,“ Fichte-Studien 43 (2016): 172-85. 
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(a) The Duplicity of the Absolute 
 
If one consults relevant passages in the lectures 1804/II one can notice a rivalry between two 
absolute principles, which may both claim for themselves to be the first principle of the 
Doctrine of Science. In the first lecture it is stated clearly that the absolute of the Doctrine of 
Science is the pure unity of being and thinking, which can be called “pure knowledge” or “I” 
(18042, 25-26; GA, II/8: 12-17). In the fifth lecture, however, comes for the first time the idea 
of God on the scene, which Fichte, completely nonchalantly, proclaims as the real absolute in 
opposition to science as its mere expression:  
 
Love of the absolute (or God) is the rational spirit’s true element, in which alone it finds peace and blessedness; 
but science is the absolute’s sweet expression; and, like the absolute, this can be loved only for its own sake (18042, 
50-51; GA, II/8: 74-75). 
 
It must be nonetheless remarked that Fichte calls it “absolute” in general, he does not declare it 
to be the absolute of the Doctrine of Science, which must be loved for its own sake. In the eighth 
lecture Fichte says: “If, as is customary, you want to call the absolutely independent One, the 
self consuming being, God, then [you could say that] all genuine existence is the intuition of 
God” (18042, 68; GA, II/8: 114-15). This is clearly a definition of the standpoint of religion 
which deals with the self-forming object in a higher sense (O’), and not with the subject-
object.23 In the following lectures, the idealism-realism-dialectic, we lose track of what the 
absolute really is. It is the absolute incognito, the real one, we are in search of, similarly to the 
method of dialectical movement in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit or Encyclopedia. In the 
 
23 One of the main tasks of the Doctrine of Science since its very beginning is to deduct from the only true first 
principle the principles of different areas of science. This includes their correction in the light of the enlightenment. 
Thus, Fichte wants us to understand the principle of theology in a right way. And this is something we learn from 
the first principle (of self-positing of reason)—God appears as a pure thought (idea of reason) as pure reason 
appears in a pure insight.  
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doctrine of reason and truth, Fichte returns to the original statement of the first lecture that 
reason, or “We”, or “I”, is the actual “one undivided being itself, in itself, of itself, through 
itself, which can never go outside itself to duality” (18042, 116; GA, II/8: 230-31)—what he 
calls a “surprising insight” that he wanted to bring his audience to. The object is here the same 
as the subject, which “lives” in the act of pure being—the I is for the I, is completely enclosed 
in the act of self-making. In the 28th lecture Fichte finally rectifies the order and hierarchy of 
absolute principles of sciences, leaving no doubt that God is the absolute of theology. The task 
of the Doctrine of Science to derive principles for other sciences by means of the reflection on 
the unity of being and thinking, it is on the act of self-positing of reason as object and subject 
at the same time, is herewith completed.  
 
(b) Why this Duplicity? 
 
There are, however, good historical and systematic-philosophical reasons for what can cause 
the above-mentioned confusion. I want to name a few concentrating myself on the latter. Firstly, 
what Fichte aims at with the esteem of the absolute of the religious standpoint is that it can be—
together with the concept of self-positing pure reason—opposed to a mere realistic 
epistemology and empirical as well as non-critical metaphysical concept of world. God and 
reason are both examples for what Fichte calls the higher or living being contrary to the being 
in the sense of a dead thing (18042, 25-26; GA, II/8: 12-17) as well as an objectivized thing-in-
itself as in traditional metaphysics.24 Secondly, this similarity can lead to fruitful parallels 
between God and pure reason. As I stated at the beginning, both principles can be designated 
by the term “absolute”, not only in the sense of being the hard core of a standpoint, but also as 
 
24 The “pure” and “living being” is a conceptual abstraction that developed together with language, as Fichte 
explains in On the Linguistic Capacity and the Origin of Language GA, I/3: 111-13. 
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the purest form of representation, it is idea. This has theoretical (i) and practical (ii) 
implications that I want to discuss briefly in the last part of my paper. 
 
(c) God and Pure Human Reason: Parallels 
 
(i) In the research program of transcendental philosophy, to create ideas of God and of the 
absolute I means to use the faculty of reason in the narrow sense. Whether Fichte’s audience 
thinks of God or of the unity of being and thinking—in both cases they are using the purest 
form of spontaneity possible to us. These mental operations can be also described as acts of 
positing, of pure (self-)activity and pure thinking, which lead to pure knowledge. In the program 
of transcendental philosophy these operations do not result in the cognition of things-in-
themselves. Instead, everyone who creates the idea of God or of the absolute I (of the pure 
reason itself) and reflects on it can notice the following: Firstly, both can be mentally 
represented as single, self-enclosed, and absolute entities in themselves, out themselves and 
through themselves. Secondly, we can neither grasp God nor the pure reason without 
objectifying them in the form of a concept. As Fichte states in the lectures 1804/II, in The Way 
Towards a Blessed Life (1806), and, for instance, in the Doctrine of Science 1812—God is a 
pure concept, and this is the way he appears in us, there is no emanation or becoming from 
God.25 While the world follows from God in Spinoza, in the Doctrine of Science it appears 
merely as an “empty concept”—and the love to God, which is the primal affect [Seinsaffekt] of 
the religious world view, gives him reality.26 Correspondingly, the self-positing reason is not a 
 
25 „[W]eg mit jenem Phantasma, eines Werdens aus Gott, […] einer Emanation“ (AzsL GA, I/9: 119, cf. WL-
1812-H GA, IV/4: 269). I abbreviate The Way Towards a Blessed Life (1806) with AzsL and the Doctrine of 
Science 1812 (Halle-Nachschrift) with WL-1812-H. 
26 In the Doctrine of Science „<finden> wir es nicht als das Seyn selbst, sondern als einen Gedanken“ (WL-1812 
GA, II/13: 52). God is a „leere[r] Begriff[] eines reinen Seyns“ (AzsL GA, I/9: 167); „leere[r], über Gottes inneres 
Wesen schlechthin keinen Aufschluß gebende[r], Begriff“ (AzsL GA, I/9: 110)—„die Liebe, ist die Quelle aller 
Gewißheit, und aller Wahrheit, und aller Realität“ (AzsL GA, I/9: 167). 
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mere being, but a thinking of this being, which has not only to be intuited intellectually, but 
also to be fixated as a concept. These are the epistemological reasons why Fichte can begin his 
late versions of the Doctrine of Science with an analysis of the idea of God. What one learns 
from the creation of the idea of God can be also applied to the thinking of the idea of pure 
reason and vice versa. For Fichte after 1800, in his vivid way of doing philosophy, it becomes 
a possible strategy to introduce the visitors of his lectures to the theory of self-positing pure 
reason.27 
 (ii) It is certainly also the religious thought of the Image of God (Imago Dei), in philosophical 
guise, which influences Fichte and makes parallels between divine and human reason—a 
merely “symbolic anthropomorphism” (Kant 2004, 108; Prol AA, IV: 357)28—possible. As 
Kant stated in many passages in his work (see, e.g., Kant 2004, 108-11; Prol AA, IV: 357-60, 
KU AA, V: 456, 460 etc. as well as KrV A672-73/B700-01 and A678/B706), it is allowed and 
is not a transcendent chain of reasoning to compare God and human reason: under the condition 
of awareness that it is merely an analogical thinking—“cognition according to analogy” (Kant 
2004, 108; Prol AA, IV: 357). For Kant it is very clear that we cannot think anything without 
categories. If we use categories to construct merely logically or formally a concept of God or 
of pure reason—for instance for the sake of critique—it does not mean that we automatically 
believe that we cognize real things-in-themselves.29 This would be a mistake of the power of 
judgement, not of the reason (see KrV A642-43/B670-71). For the analogical thinking of divine 
 
27 A motive for this strategy could have been given by Friedrich Karl Forberg, „Briefe über die neueste 
Philosophie,“ Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft teutscher Gelehrten 6 (1) (1797), 44-88, who noticed 
that both ideas, the absolute I and God, seem ungraspable. 
28 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science with 
Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).   
29 For Kant’s formal construction and determination of transcendental ideas with 12 categories see the above-




and human reason, which, as Kant states, can be used for didactical reasons, for instance, in 
religious practice and education, he uses the category of causality: 
 
I will say: the causality of the highest cause is that, with respect to the world, which human reason is with respect 
to its works of art. Thereby the nature of the highest cause itself remains unknown to me: I compare only its effect 
(the order of the world), which is known to me, and the conformity with reason of this effect, with the effects of 
human reason that are known to me, and in consequence I call the highest cause a reason, without thereby ascribing 
to it as its property the same thing I understand by this expression in humans, or in anything else known to me 
(Kant 2004, 110; Prol AA, IV: 360, markations by M.L.). 
 
The same way of thinking of pure reason as of a faculty that has causality over (a) the will and 
(b) the understanding, and its picture and modification of the world, compared to God’s reason, 
is something we encounter already in the early Fichte: 
 
Ad (a): 
[T]he categorical, the quality of the [moral, M.L.] law as simply unconditioned and incapable of being 
conditioned—this points to our higher origin, to our spiritual descent. It is a divine spark in us, and a pledge that 
We are of His race (Fichte 2010, 20; VCO GA, I/1: 145).30 
 
Ad (b): 
Dogmatists who {consider the world to be something that exists by itself and who} nevertheless retain their moral 
and religious sentiments have to say that God created the world. {They cannot, however, explain this any further; 
for no understanding is produced, no matter how the dogmatist construes this claim.} The dogmatists consider 
God to be a pure intellect, the determinations of which can surely consist in nothing but concepts. This is also how 
the I has been considered here: it is a {pure} intellect, and its determinations are nothing but pure concepts. A 
material world is also present for the I, and therefore these pure concepts must transform themselves into a material 
 
30 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, ed. Allan Wood, trans. Garrett Green 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).   
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world-though only into one that exists purely for the intellect. In the case of God, in contrast, these pure concepts 
must be transformed into a self-sufficient material world, one that also exists for another intellect {- which is quite 
unintelligible}. The transcendental idealist has to explain only the former process; i.e., he has to show how the 
pure concepts {of a finite intellect}, considered in a certain way, transform themselves into material substances, 
{[that is,] into a material world for this intellect-which is something that can and should be shown by the 
philosopher} (FTP, 418-19; WLnm[K] GA, IV/3: 496, see also GWL GA, I/2: 390-92).  
 
Before falling prey to later Fichte’s vivid terminology and imaginary, the proponents of 
mystical interpretation of his works should give thought to this function of cognitions according 
to analogy that Fichte used from the early works on. The (i) parallels encountered in thinking 
of God and reason, and (ii) the analogies between the “highest reason”, and theoretical and 
practical sides of the human pure reason are perfect transcendental means—especially in the 
context of the past Atheism dispute—to give Fichte’s audience a ladder to the standpoint of the 




So, is the insight in the 15th lecture surprising? It might feel so the first time one reads the 
Doctrine of Science 1804/II and it certainly felt so for Fichte’s audience in Berlin. But it should 
not be surprising after (I) the systematic reconstruction of the structure of these lectures with 
the help of the five standpoints and the subject-object-symbolism. The higher realism, the 
giving herself or himself up to a self-forming, living object (O’), is something common to the 
fourth standpoint in the hierarchy of the five “absolutes”, spheres of reason and knowledge, and 
world views. And it should also not be surprising after (II) considering (i) the epistemic thought 
experiments that lead to cognition of parallels in thinking of God and pure reason, and (ii) the 
symbolic-anthropomorphic analogies between God’s and human’s pure reason. There is no 
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better way for Fichte’s audience to get into the Doctrine of Science and experience pure reason’s 
activity than in thinking the absolute being (understanding it first as God and then as the 
absolute I, it is reason, that creates the idea of God and of itself). There is, despite of any 
technical, introductory, or other differences, a consistence in central determinations between 
the earlier and the later versions of the Doctrine of Science. The key concepts to notice and 
understand it—and which I have worked with—are subject-object, idealism-realism, and pure 
reason, which essence lies in the self-positing, and which is an alternative name for the absolute 
I, both in the earlier and later versions of the Doctrine of Science: “reason is simply the I, and 
cannot be anything else than I” (18042, 192; GA, II/8: 400). Reason was, after all, since the 
beginning of Kant’s transcendental project (as the faculty of pure reason in the narrow sense) 
responsible for ideas and absoluteness. Kant occasionally called it “pure activity” [reine 
Tätigkeit], “pure self-activity” [reine Selbsttätigkeit], “spontaneity”, “causality”, “freedom” 
and “the true I” [das eigentliche Ich] throughout his works. This, as Fichte would say, should 
be grasped energetically and examined systematically.  
 
 
